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countable. And as mentioned, the international 
community must play an increased role in bring-
ing these conditions to bear.  
 
Thank you for your kind attention. 
  
 
 
Burzine Waghmar  
Centre for the Study of Pakistan and SOAS South Asia Institute, University of London (U.K.)  
“Beleaguered Balochs: Muslim Republics Murdering Muslim Minorities” 
 
 
If Afghanistan has earned the sobriquet, ‘grave-
yard of empires’, no less a claim is that of Balo-
chistan, namely, Pakistan’s qabrastan (grave-
yard).1 The province, geographically Pakistan’s 
as well as Iran’s largest, has become just that 
what with more than 14,800 disappearances 
since 2001, according to the Voice of Baloch 
Missing Persons, and the clockwork regularity 
with which the establishment’s self-styled 
janbaz (gallant-hearted) custodians ‘pick up and 
dump’ Baloch corpses, particularly men, but also 
entire families, students, teachers, journalists 
and human rights activists.2 It brings to mind the 
                                                                
Disclaimer: The views expressed herein constitute my 
sole prerogative. They neither imply nor suggest the 
orientation, views, current thinking or position of the 
university, school or regional and research study 
centres with which I hold affiliation. 
1
 Matthew Green, ‘Special Report: the struggle Paki-
stan does not want reported,’ Reuters, Karachi, Sep. 
24, 2013, online: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/24/us-
pakistan-disappearances-specialreport-
idUSBRE98N0OA20130924; Ahmed Rashid, ‘Balochi-
stan: the untold story of Pakistan’s other war,’ BBC 
News, Feb. 22, 2014, online: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26272897  
2
 Pakistan 2013 Human Rights Report, p. 7. Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U. S. Dept. 
of State, online: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2206
14.pdf 
Baloch balladeer’s plaint, bauf dighari thaht 
hagant ‘my pillow was made of the ground’.  
 
Cold comfort, however, to the kith and kin of 
those slain who, upon securing their remains 
mutilated by Pakistani forces, are at least able to 
arrange prayers and make-shift funerals. Iranian 
Balochs, on the other hand, like other ostensibly 
equal Sunni citizens of that Islamic republic, 
cannot pray in Tehran, for that urban conurba-
tion of some fourteen millions, the largest me-
tropolis in West Asia and only Muslim capital 
city, are prohibited from praying never mind 
possessing Sunni mosques not a few of which 
flourish in the bosoms of the ‘Great Satan’ 
(Washington, DC) and ‘Little Satan’ (Tel Aviv).3 I 
must, as an aside, confess ignorance of any pre-
arrangements for the spiritual needs of the ma-
jority of Muslims, namely, Sunnis, at the eighth 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit 
                                                                
3
 Ahmad Reza Taheri, ‘The Sociopolitical Culture of 
Iranian Baloch Elites,’ Iranian Studies 46/6, 2013, p. 
991 and n. 44; Saeed Kamali Dehghani, ‘Sunni Mus-
lims banned from holding own Eid prayers in Tehran,’ 
The Guardian (Aug. 31, 2011), online: 
http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2011/aug/31/iran-forbids-sunni-eid-
prayers; Houchang 
Chehabi, ‘The Legal Aspects of Religious Diversity in 
Iran,’ lecture delivered at the Centre for Iranian Stud-
ies, SOAS, London, May 15, 2013, online: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=raPWh9XcPr8&lis
t=    
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convened in Tehran, December 9-11, 1997. 
What is common knowledge though is that only 
six out of 22 Arab heads of state attended.4 Fur-
ther, Sunni diplomats posted to the land of the 
ayatollahs hold their weekly Friday afternoon 
prayers in the precincts of the Pakistan embassy 
school.5   
 
On Pakistan’s 66th Independence Day, August 
14 2013, Raza Jahangeer Baloch, secretary-
general of the Baloch Student Organization 
(Azad), was killed in Turbat. Next day, August 15, 
it was the turn of Sindhi nationalists of the Jeay 
Sindh Tehrik [Eternal Sindh Movement], three of 
whom were publicly killed by Karachi police in a 
park, which runs counter to the later claims of 
the deputy inspector that they were killed in 
custody.6 The Tehrik’s moorings were anchored 
in the musings of the late G. M. Syed (1904-95), 
who, in the first instance, steered the Pakistan 
resolution through the Sind assembly in the 
1940s, only to regret endorsing this Muslim Zi-
on.7 His subsequent detention and house arrest, 
during the last thirty years of his life, was ex-
pended in contrition rather than reflection. En-
visaging an independent Sindhudesh in one of 
his best known tracts, Heenyar Pakistan khey 
tuttan khappey [Now Pakistan Should Disinte-
grate], was irksome, obviously, to Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, a fellow Sindhi, sometime Bombay mu-
hajir (émigré), full-time opportunist, all-time 
                                                                
4
 Martin Kramer, ‘Islamic Summit in Tehran: beyond 
the hype,’ Policy Watch 287, Dec. 9, 1997, The Wash-
ington Institute, online:  
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/the-islamic-summit-in-tehran-beyond-
the-hype 
5
http://www.islamicfinder.org/getitWorld.php?id=10
8490&lang=arabic 
6
 Pakistan 2013 Human Rights Report, p. 3.  
7
 Long held by those of us in the know within aca-
deme, this overdue analogy has now entered general 
readership with the publication of Faisal Devji, Mus-
lim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (London, 2013).   
debauch, and a Sunni8, who, along with a Shia 
Shah reigning across the border, was the archi-
tect of the real beginnings of Balochistan’s spiral 
into murder and mayhem. Bhutto was, besides 
Mujibur Rahman, one of Bangladesh’s founding 
fathers but now squirmed at the thought of 
siring Sindhudesh or Balochistan ‘doing another 
Bengal’. But Syed, as pointed out, had galvanised 
his provincial leadership to throw in their lot 
with the Muslim League. Nobody thought of 
consulting northern Balochs of British India’s 
Chief Commissioner’s Province or their southern 
brethren represented by an unrepresentative 
feudal council (jirga) if they desired fusing and, 
in turn, being hosted in the house that Jinnah 
built.9   
 
Neither do the Pashtuns as is borne by the his-
torical record only too well known to be re-
hearsed here: Afghan refugees, as Pakistani 
NGOs have reported, find themselves arbitrarily 
rounded up in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa or NWFP 
(which I still prefer as an English orientalist), and 
Balochistan, in February 2013, following attacks 
on the Hazara Shia domiciled in Quetta. Earlier, 
a discredited federal administration attempted 
to burnish its credentials when its Interior Minis-
try’s July 2012 report audaciously attempted an 
even-handed mention of 868 individuals as hav-
ing been killed in Balochistan between 2010 and 
that date, and that the onus of these killings lay 
with the Baloch Liberation Army and the Lash-
                                                                
8
 And not a Shia as incorrectly noted, a regrettable 
lapsus, in my ‘Yet another Stan? Talibanisation and 
Islamic Radicalism in Balochistan and Southwest 
Asia,’ What Future for Balochistan? Global and Re-
gional Challenges, UNPO Conference Report (The 
Hague, 2013), p. 26.  
9
 Malik Siraj Akbar, ‘From Bangladesh to Balochistan: 
Pakistan owes an apology,’ The World Post, Jan. 3, 
2014, online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-
siraj-akbar/from-bangladesh-to-
baloch_b_4534394.html 
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kar-e Jhangvi, a Deobandist-inspired, ISI-
sponsored Sunni militant group among other 
anti-state separatists undermining Pakistan’s 
territorial integrity.10 Any lingering doubt regard-
ing integrity was presently dispelled by the 
Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappear-
ances whose intrinsic reluctance to broach the 
issue of absconding civilians with Pakistan’s do-
mestic intelligence and law-enforcement agen-
cies sharply brought into relief its partisanship 
among Baloch groups.11 Such enforced disap-
pearances were rampant across the NWFP and 
FATA. The UN’s Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances visited Quetta, the 
provincial Baloch capital, in September 2012. In 
its February 2013 report, the Working Group 
condemned the striking absence of mention of 
the state’s intelligence organs, which are princi-
pally and repeatedly culpable for such disap-
pearances.  The Supreme Court, Pakistan’s apex 
judicial body, was stonewalled when its three-
member bench held a special session hearing at 
the Quetta registry of the Supreme Court over 
two days in August 2013. That bench, led by 
Justice Chaudhury, demanded that the intelli-
gence agencies, police and stationed Frontier 
Corps come clean within a fortnight on all miss-
ing individuals. The security agencies, in a writ-
ten judgment statement dated August 28, 2013, 
committed themselves, ‘to hand over any uni-
formed officers who were involved in the abduc-
tion of citizens in Balochistan.’12 Another Sep-
tember 2013 hearing in that city also led no-
where despite notices issued by the Supreme 
Court to the inspector-general of Balochistan 
police and the inspector-general of the Frontier 
Corps for failing to co-operate.13  
 
                                                                
10
 Pakistan 2013 Human Rights Report, p. 3. 
11
 Pakistan 2013 Human Rights Report, p. 7. 
12
 Ibid.  
13
 Ibid. 
Such an infirmity of purpose and culture of law-
lessness run through the warp and weft of Paki-
stani officialdom which, for the record, does not 
permit the ICRC (International Committee of the 
Red Cross) to have access to those held at de-
tention sites in Balochistan, NWFP and FATA. 
The 2009 Aghaz-e Huquq-e Balochistan remains 
a farce, as with so much else with Pakistanis in 
particular and South Asians at large, for illegal 
detention of Balochs continues and the panacea 
package mooted for Balochi woes, social, eco-
nomic and political, remains a pious proclama-
tion on paper.14  
 
Post-2014, the Balochi canker continues to fes-
ter. Some would claim a tipping point is on the 
anvil. Yet others that we are well passed it. 
There are several such tipping points across 
South Asia where the basic conditions of civil 
existence have broken down. In the Balochi con-
text, we are dealing with an insufficiently imag-
ined nationalist movement.15 Not all the reasons 
for it can be enumerated here save salient fea-
tures. They are, it may be reiterated, posited by 
an orientalist, not futurist. I can tell you what 
has happened, not what will. But Churchill 
soundly forewarned that, ‘the further back you 
look, the further forward you can see.’ This 
could not be truer for the Orient – and Orientals. 
Muslim Orientals, in this particular case.  
 
Consider then the facts: the Balochs are a non-
starter insofar as the Islamic world goes. Why? 
Because, unlike Palestinians, Kashmiris, Uyghurs, 
or Moros (Filipino Muslims), the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC), which putatively artic-
                                                                
14
 Pakistan 2013 Human Rights Report, p. 21.  
15
 As pointed out by Sushant Sareen, ‘Balochistan is 
no Bangladesh,’ IDSA Comment, Jan. 19, 2010, Insti-
tute for Defence Studies and Analyses, online: 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/BalochistannoBan
gladesh_ssareen_190110 
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ulates the aspirations of 57 Muslim polities, is, 
like the Islamically-inspired Arab League or GCC, 
a veritable talking-shop. Balochs and Bolors in 
Pakistan or Kurds in Iraq, Syria and Turkey are 
disgruntled Muslim minorities with long-
standing grievances against oppressive, fellow 
Muslims – not imperialists or infidels, bluntly 
put, non-Muslims. Had their abusers been so, it 
would make for a shrill rallying point among 
concerned, cynical Muslims who would extract 
as much political mileage as possible by high-
lighting their plight and portraying non-Muslims 
as tormentors and Muslims, yet again, torment-
ed. There is a cognitive dissonance here in that 
corporate loyalty trumps any and every contra-
diction, commission or omission. It would be 
detrimental to Muslim unity, and meddlesome 
too, so the thinking goes, by asking fellowmen to 
put their house in order whether Turks, Paki-
stanis, Iranians or others, none of who are 
squeamish about dealing with their recalcitrant 
denizens hence the stunning, selective silence 
about such Muslim minorities at the OIC. The 
hapless Balochs certainly are a common concern 
to both ‘brotherly’ Muslim republics, Iran and 
Pakistan, who will stop at nothing to check their 
‘anti-national’ or ‘misguided’ insurgency. 
 
Iranian Balochs, like their eastern Pakistani 
kinsmen, perhaps more ruefully than them, 
know full well their tenuous relationship with 
Tehran, a regime whose ideological raison d’etre 
is predicated upon a peculiarly Persian version 
of Twelver Shia Islam recrudescent after 1979. 
The Revolutionary Guards, those republic’s 
Rottweilers, are there to obliterate Balochs 
among other dissenters, Sunni and Shia, who 
threaten the ‘victory of the Islamic revolution’.  
Neither Tehran nor Islamabad would dare to 
question never mind castigate Beijing over its 
treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang (Chinese or 
Eastern Turkestan). For one thing, they cannot 
afford to do so. And pretty much most of the 
OIC would think twice before taking cudgels with 
the Chinese. No such reservations, however, 
come into play when criticising Israelis, Indians, 
Americans or Europeans over alleged mistreat-
ment of Muslims. Had the Balochs, for example, 
been non-Muslims, both Iran and Pakistan 
would have finished them off in no time. Otto-
man Turkey briskly did so with its Armenian irre-
dentists leading to the 1915 genocide. And so 
did West Pakistan’s military junta with Bengali 
nationalists in the eastern wing by practically 
decimating its Hindu minority which it held re-
sponsible for being a fifth column in east Paki-
stan. It is more difficult, however, to declare 
fellow Muslims as heretics or infidels. Historical-
ly jihad would then be justified – as is evinced by 
the supplying, subventing and sponsoring of 
fanatics against deemed crypto-Muslims like 
Assad’s Alawites whose bloodletting is both 
permissible and promoted – but such is not the 
case with mainstream Sunni Balochs. But it does 
not connote the Balochs have not felt the harsh 
hand of alien rule for most of Pakistan’s exist-
ence. Punjabi and Pashtun Sunnis, the rank and 
file of the Frontier Corps, remain pre-occupied 
in the ‘pick up and dump’ routine of fellow Sun-
ni, Hanafis or middle-class, politically conscious, 
alienated, impoverished Balochs.16 It is they who 
are paying the price for, as stated above, an 
insufficiently imagined national movement, un-
                                                                
16
 Malik Siraj Akbar, ‘Why Pakistan is embarrassed to 
talk about Balochistan?’The World Post, Mar. 12, 
2014, online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-
siraj-akbar/why-pakistan-is-
embar-
rass_b_4937159.html?utm_hp_ref=world&ir=WorldP
ost;  
Akbar founded in 2009 the first online English-
language newspaper and social platform from his 
homeland, The Baloch Hal. He recently authored The 
Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist Move-
ment ([Bloomington], 2013).   
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like their tribal chieftains, whose lack of political 
direction and imagination is compensated by 
fractious one-upmanship.  
 
So could a replay of 1973 be possible if, say, Iran 
and Pakistan jointly decide to tackle the Baloch 
question once and for all? An increasingly des-
pised Shia Iran, given its support for Syria, lacks 
credibility in the predominantly (Sunni) Muslim 
world would that it were to assist Islamabad in 
any such venture. The Saudis would come down 
very heavily on those Punjabis running their 
Pakistani plantation. Any such reprisals, overtly 
or covertly, by Teheran would have far-reaching 
consequences for Pakistan’s Shia, a besieged, 
outraged minority which, arguably, more than 
any other marginalised group in Pakistan today, 
has reaped a grim dividend for their loyalty to 
the land of the Quaid-e Azam, himself a Shia.  
 
The Baloch separatists have remained non-
sectarian and non-confessional in their opposi-
tion to the Islamabad establishment.17 Linguisti-
cally, anthropologically, and psychologically, the 
Balochs do fulfill certain criteria towards being 
recognised as a ‘nation’, something which the 
Pakistan movement, a motley assortment of 
Muslim Zionists from the minority districts of 
British India expressly united in animus against a 
Hindu-dominated Congress, never did, but who, 
nevertheless, patched together an artifice where 
Urdu was declared a national language, the 
mother-tongue of barely 8% of the populace, 
and, where no two Muslim divines, when que-
ried by the 1953 Justice Munir Commission, 
could concur on defining Islam. Pakistanis still 
don’t. But they can agree, evidently, on singing 
Dil Dil Pakistan [My Heart is Pakistan], a pop 
                                                                
17
 Peter Tatchell, ‘Terror and Talibanisation in Balo-
chistan,’ Ceasefire, Sep. 13, 2011, online: 
http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/tatchell-on-
balochistan/   
number regarded as Pakistan’s unofficial an-
them and produced by Vital Signs, the late Miss 
Bhutto’s favourite band. That troupe, like her, 
has trooped off the stage. But its lyrics endure 
which the Frontier Corps, Punjabis and Pashtuns 
to man, force Balochs during stop and search 
swoops to sing extempore.18 Would the Frontier 
Corps or the regular Pakistan army dare compel 
hardened FATA inhabitants or puritanical Tehrik-
e Taleban-e Pakistan (TTP) fighters to sing it? If 
and when so, that day will be a game-changer. 
Not so much for Pakistanis but its beleaguered 
Balochs for whom the road winding out of Paki-
stan’s qabrastan may meander through Nimruz, 
Helmand and Qandahar.19 For now, as Josh Mull 
baldly observed, ‘[T]he Taliban's all-important 
Quetta Shura is in Balochistan, so the Pakistani 
military can’t have any American troops that 
close to a key military asset. So they instead 
“clear” Balochistan of “Islamic terrorists” (dem-
ocratic Baloch dissidents, not Taliban) and re-
move it from American calculations.’20    
                                                                
18
 Sushant Sareen, art. cit.  
19
 ‘Cementing Pashtun-Baloch unity essential,’ Af-
ghanistan Times, online: 
http://www.afghanistantimes.af/news_details.php?id
=3879&& 
cid=4  
20
 Josh Mull, ‘Preparing the American invasion of 
Pakistan,’ The Huffington Post, June 3, 2010, online: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ / 
josh-mull/preparing-the-american-in_b_600014.html 
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